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One of the original characteristics of French communism has been its durable strength in 
some rural areas ever since its foundation at the December 1920 Congres de Tours. Over the 
past six decades, the Communists have found strong support not only in certain urban, 
industrial areas but in some of the more rural and backward areas of the country as well. The 
Communist party's implantation in the countryside - both in terms of militants and voters - has 
been concentrated among a number of departments along the northern and western edge of the 
Massif Central, and along the Mediterranean littoral. The first time the Communists were up 
for national office - in 1 924 - they scored best not in an urban department but in the 
overwhelmingly rural Lot-et-Garonne (south-east of Bordeaux) where they gathered over 30% 
of the valid votes cast. Eight of the eighteen departments where they did best in that year were 
predominantly rural. By 1 936 the Party's strength in rural areas had increased notably. The 
Communists received over 20% of the vote in sixteen departments, nine of which can hardly be 
considered industrial, and in three of these over 60% of the active population was engaged in 
agriculture. During the interwar years it is estimated that 15% of the Party's members belonged 
to the agricultural professions.1 The question which springs to mind, then, is why the 
Communists have done so well (and continued to do so in the 1980s during a period of 
vertiginous electoral decline) in rural departments which hardly correspond, from a sociological 
perspective, to the image one has of the parti de la classe ouvriere? 
The Communist party's rural implantation has largely been ignored by historians and 
political scientists alike. Primarily interested in the relationship between the Party and the 
working class (or barring that, the intellectuals), historians of French communism, joined by 
those interested in the French peasantry, have uncritically accepted the standard - though rarely 
substantiated - explanation of why rural voters casts their ballots for the Communist party. The 
Communist party's strong showing in certain rural regions (such as the Limousin and the 
Dordogne, which I will discuss here) has usually been attributed to the existence of a long­
standing leftist political tradition or a tradition democratique tres avancee.2 According to this 
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explanation, successive generations of voters in the countryside, determined to vote as far left as 
possible, cast their ballots in logical succession toujours plus a gauche (always further on the
Left) - starting with the democrates-socialistes in 1 849, then moving on to the Radicals, the 
Socialists in the first decades of the century, and, last but not least, the Communists after 1920. 
This line of argument was first proposed in the early twenties by Daniel Halevy in his 
classic book on rural life in central France.3 It was later developed and popularized by Ernest 
Labrousse, and in particular by Fran9ois Goguel in a series of influential works on French 
electoral geography.4 Attempting to explain Communist successes in the 1 946 Correze, Goguel 
argued that communism "purely and simply succeeded Ledru-Rollin's Mountain. It owes its 
strength to the fact that it is "the furthest on the Left" of French parties, the successor of 
socialism twenty years ago and radicalism fifty years ago .. .  "5 This explanation was extended by 
Goguel, and other leading observers of French political life, to all rural regions where the Party 
scored well at the polls.6 Rural communism, in short, was the outgrowth of an old republican 
tradition, and was nothing but "an old bottle, with a new label;" the contents remained 
unchanged. 7 
The tradition argument, based on the haphazard visual correlations characteristic of 
much of French electoral geography, poses more far more problems than it actually solves. It is 
tellmg that trad1t10n been forwarded as the explanat10n of Commumst votmg only m those areas 
where the presence of an industrialized working class cannot be invoked as constituting the 
basis of Communist party support.8 Tradition may well be a central component of the 
electorate's choice in some regions, but this is difficult to prove. Moreover, the proponents of 
the tradition de gauche interpretation fail to provide any convincing explanation of why large 
numbers of peasants, sharecroppers, tenant farmers, artisans, shopkeepers, and rural workers 
never moved beyond support for the Radicaux Socia/istes (and their allies), while others cast 
their ballots in favor of Socialist and Communist candidates. What differentiated rural voters 
who backed the Communist party from those who did not? And what evidence can be 
forwarded to suggest that rural communism indeed did hark back to democ-soc and Radical 
roots? By using the murky category of tradition to explain rural political behavior, observers 
have devaluated Communist (and Socialist) voting in the countryside. Voters, they imply, 
backed leftist parties more out of habit than to express support for a particular social, political, 
and ideological agenda. In their eyes, rural communism was little more than a radicalized 
version of Radicalism. 
Historians and political scientists, who have investigated the Party's social bases of 
support in great detail in urban areas, have all but ignored it in the countryside. More often 
than not, the general consensus has been that if workers vote for the Communist party, they do 
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so because of their position as workers. When rural dwellers do so, however, their motives (or 
so it is suggested) are clearly Jess related to their broader position within society. 9 Those 
observers who have gone beyond the standard leftist tradition argument and ventured estimates 
of the social composition of the rural communist electorate have argued that it varied greatly 
within regions, and that alongside small-holding peasants the Party found support from a 
variety of occupational groups in the countryside. Jacques Girault, writing on the Var in the 
1930s, finds that the presence of workers favored the Party's implantation; in certain cantons 
Communists captured substantial support among cultivators while in other areas their supporters 
tended to be wine-growers.10 Michel Cade's recent work on the Pyrenees-Orientales suggests 
the Party's rural electorate was composed largely of rural workers (miners, textile-workers), 
"peasant-workers" , as well as small property owners and agricultural workers in wine growing 
areas.11 A study of Communist strength in rural districts of the Puy-de-D6me, where the Party 
was not particularly well established, concludes that temporary migrants and especially workers 
who lived in rural settings contributed decisively to Party support; the Party's electorate was also 
composed of peasants and, in some regions, agricultural workers.12 Just to the north, in the 
Allier, Sally Sokoloff has proposed that contrary to common assumptions the bulk of the Party's 
backers at the polls was not composed of sharecroppers, but of small property owners and 
tenant farmers from the Montluc;on area.13 Finally, in a national overview of the years 
following the Second World War, Gordon Wright thought the Party found its staunchest rural 
supporters among farm laborers, marginal tenant farmers, and sharecroppers while also making 
inroads among small owners and "moderately prosperous small tenants"; at the same time, he 
suggested that a "considerable share" of the party's support came from small towns located in 
rural settings.14 
These estimates of the Communist vote - however plausible some may appear - should 
be considered as hypotheses, based as they are on little verifiable evidence, and the authors in 
question often violate elementary methodological and statistical rules to reach their conclusions. 
It is well worth repeating that the Party's strength in communes and cantons with large numbers 
of peasant voters, for example, does not necessarily mean that it received support from that 
particular social group. Nor are visual correlations based on maps, graphs, or raw figures, a 
reliable method for examining the relationship between social structure and political preference. 
The origins and composition of the rural Communist electorate merit more than 
superficial attention. Estimates of who Communist voters were, and who they supported in the 
past are key to gaining a clearer understanding of a rural Communist movement which in more 
ways than one was distinct from its urban counterpart. At a time when historians are less 
interested in broader questions concerning the French Communist party's purpose [ti quoi sert le 
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Par ti communiste frani;ais? (PCF)], 15 and more interested in determining, on the local level, who 
used the PCF and for what purpose they did so, this is an appropriate area of inquiry.16 The 
French Communist movement was not a monolith, but had numerous regional and local 
variations, as leaders and militants adapted themselves to different social and economic 
circumstances - not to mention electoral clienteles. Examining the rural Communist electorate 
constitutes one of the most reliable, fruitful approaches to the study of one particular 
communism. 
The analysis of rural communism, however, has relevance beyond the study of the PCF. 
Much excellent work has been undertaken of late on the complex relationship between French 
peasants and politics over the past two centuries.17 While some of this work has transformed 
the way we think about politics in the countryside, the question of how rural dwellers actually 
cast their ballots has remained an intractable problem. The age-old puzzle of who voted for a 
specific party is a particularly vexing one, and the French school of electoral geography, with 
its cartographical penchant, is not particularly well suited to the task.18 Scholars of rural 
France, not always aware of the ecological fallacy's existence, have often skated on thin ice 
when estimating the origins and social composition of a political party's electorate. And, as a 
result, one of the central questions for those interested in rural political behavior - how did 
������1ue.asan.ts....Y.Qte....an.d....hJJ.w_did..1h.eiL.Yoie_change_o.Ye.r...1ime1_,._n�.n1:Uns. 1argel.y--1llllll1�.re .. ����������-
It is, however, possible to examine voting traditions and past electoral behavior without 
doing undue violence to the evidence, and I shall attempt to do so here for one of the 
Communist party's rural bastions during the interwar years: the Limousin (departments of the 
Correze, Creuse, Haute-Vienne) and the Dordogne. The Communists found strong support from 
the early twenties on in parts of these poor, isolated agricultural regions located on the south­
western edge of the Massif Central, where mixed farming (polyculture) and livestock raising 
remained the dominant activities.19 The Communists were best implanted in the Correze - the 
subject of much of the following analysis - where their backing remained relatively stable, 
averaging 1 9.6% of the vote over the four interwar elections. Just to the north, in the Creuse, 
the Party's efforts never met with much consistent success and its support here was usually 
lower than in the nation as a whole. In the Dordogne, the Communist party hovered around the 
1 3 %  mark in the twenties, lost support in 1 932, before more than doubling its score to 22% of 
the vote - one of the better results in the nation - in the 1 936 Popular Front elections. · In the 
Haute-Vienne, the Communists' results see-sawed notably, but their strong showing in 1 928 
(2 1 %) and to a lesser degree in 1 936 ( 1 7  .1 %) demonstrated that they could be successful in this 
area when their local leadership presented n1ore suitable candidates and policies. 
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These results were achieved within varying political contexts. The Creuse, Correze, and 
Dordogne remained areas of important - though steadily declining - Radical (in the broad sense 
of the term) influence. This decline was most apparent in the Creuse where the Radicals had 
been replaced by the Socialists as the department's dominant party by the early thirties. In the 
Correze, radicalism remained the principal political force until it nose-dived in 1 936, and in the 
process it was overtaken by both socialism, which had grown consistently since 1 928, and 
communism. In the Dordogne, on the other hand, the Radicals never gave up their leading 
position and together with centrist leaders dominated the local political landscape until the 
Popular Front elections. Support for the Right, already low by national standards, declined 
consistently in all three departments in the two decades following the First World War. 
The Haute-Vienne, one of the Socialist party's bastions in France ever since 1 9 10, 
constitutes a different case. Here the Socialists reigned supreme as early as 1 9 1 4  when they 
obtained 55% of the vote and by 1 9 1 9  the Radicals, who had obtained the backing of 42% of 
the voters only nine years earlier, had been eliminated from the political scene. The strength of 
socialism in the Haute-Vienne left little room for the center-left and this, in turn, may have 
contributed to the more notable presence of the interwar Right, although its score remained well 
under the nationwide average. 
This region was thus characterized by the overwhelming and consistent strength of the 
Left. The period under study witnessed an important reordering in the ranking of political 
parties within the Left: broadly speaking, radicalism declined, while Socialists and Communists 
established themselves, though not always consistently nor simultaneously. 
The following analysis of the Communist vote in the Limousin and the Dordogne has 
three broad objectives. First, through a correlational analysis of village-level electoral results I 
will draw a geographical profile of the Communist party's backing over time, and examine if 
indeed the Communists did benefit from a well-established toujours. plus ii gauche tradition.
Second, I will turn to the technique known as ecological regression in order to estimate 
individual level voter behavior between successive elections in the Correze. How loyal were 
Communist voters to their Party? And who had they supported before the Communist party's 
foundation in December 1 920? Finally, I will also use ecological regression to gauge the social 
basis of the Communist electorate in the interwar Correze and compare it to that of other 
parties. 
Unless otherwise noted the electoral analysis is based on first round communal level 
results for nine legislative elections between 1 898 and 1 936. This data has been collected for all 
760 villages, towns, and bourgs of the Correze, Creuse, and Haute-Vienne, as well as for the 
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Dordogne's forty seven cantons.20 The results of the May 1 849 legislative elections, which are 
only available by canton, have also been included in this analysis.21 
I 
The central point that emerges from the detailed correlational analysis is the remarkable 
geographical continuity of the Communist vote throughout the Limousin and the Dordogne.22 
The correlations of the Party's electoral results for the interwar elections are, in the great 
majority of cases, far stronger than those of any other political party.23 In the Correze, for 
example, the correlations of the Communist party's score on the communal level in pairs of 
successive elections grow consistently stronger over time, never dipping below .77 (PC1924-
PC 1 928) and reaching the .84 mark for the 1 932 and 1 936 elections(table 1 ). This suggests that 
the Party benefited from similar geographical patterns of support throughout this entire period. 
By and large, the same communes backed the Party from election to election and they did so in 
the same relative order: communes which voted heavily for the Communists in 1 924 would, in 
the majority of cases, tend to do so again in future elections, just as those that had failed to 
support communism would generally behave similarly in years to come. These notably strong 
correlations underline that changes in the Communist vote were not restricted to specific 
communes but were across the board, and this had clearly been the case since 1 924 when the 
Party first presented itself before the electorate. Throughout the twenties and thirties the 
Party's communal geographical ordering of support remained roughly the same. 
The principal characteristic of the Communist vote was its locational stability. The 
Party underwent no major electoral realignment during this period; on the contrary, its 
geographic base of support was continuously strengthened between successive elections. The 
long term correlations from 1 924 on are remarkably consistent as well (PC1924-PC1932: .76; 
PC 1 924-PC 1 936: . 72), thus clearly demonstrating that the Party was geographically stable in the 
short run (from election to election) as well as in the longer run (to see change between 
succeeding elections the correlation matrix should be read diagonally; the matrix should be 
consulted vertically to observe changes over the longer term). This distinguishes the 
Communists from opponents such as the Socialists and the Radicals who may have enjoyed 
moderate geographical continuity between consecutive elections, but who rarely did so over any 
lengthier time period (see tables 2 and 3). 
The Communist party's geographical permanence was equally impressive in the 
neighboring Haute-Vienne, and this despite fluctuations in voter support both more important 
and frequent than in the Correze (table 4). In the Dordogne, the Party's geographical stability 
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at the cantonal level was not quite as consistent as it was in the Correze and the Haute-Vienne 
(table 5). Finally, in the Creuse, Communists were unable to secure a stable base of support in 
their early years. Only as of 1 928 did the Creusois Communists achieve a notable degree of 
locational continuity, although the coefficients underline that this stability was somewhat weaker 
than in the rest of the Limousin (table 6). 
The Communist vote throughout the Limousin and the Dordogne was characterized by 
an unusually high degree of electoral stability, and this distinguished it from its rivals. Major 
changes in the Communist party's line - such as the adoption of the class against class tactic in 
November 1 927 - did not lead to notable alterations in the Party's implantation. The Party's 
territorial permanence was unaffected by variations - even important ones - in the percentage 
vote it received in legislative elections. Communist gains and losses were not confined to any 
particular region but were, on the contrary, relatively evenly spread out among all communes, 
and this regardless of how well or poorly the Party was implanted. No other political force in 
the interwar Limousin and Dordogne acquired such a solid, unchanging base of support in the 
first half of the twentieth-century, and no other party's electoral behavior bore such striking 
resemblance from one department to another. And none of the Party's opponents on the Left 
proved able to conserve their geographical base for any extended period of time. Only the 
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intermediary term, but to a lesser degree than the Communist party. The Communists were 
truly the Party of stability - a stability which constituted both the source of the Party's success 
and a major barrier to its development. The Communists preserved their zones of strength, but 
they met with great difficulty finding significant numbers of new supporters in areas where 
they were poorly established. 
The origins of the Communist party's stable patterns of support can be traced back to 
pre-1920 socialism. In the Correze, the correlations of the SFIO (Section f ran9aise de 
l'internationale ouvriere) vote between adjacent elections in the first two decades of the century 
are relatively strong (though not quite to the same degree as they would be for the Communists 
later on), suggesting that socialism, in its formative years in the Correze, 24 found a geographical 
base of support which it would preserve to a large extent before it was inherited and further 
strengthened by the Communists in the early twenties. Communes which voted Socialist in 
1 906, 1 9 1 0, and 1 9 1 4  (in whatever proportion) had a marked tendency to vote Communist early 
on, although this relationship had clearly weakened by the early thirties. The Socialist vote in 
1 9 1 4  is more highly correlated with the Communist one in 1 928 (PS 1 9 1 4-PC1 928: .6 1 )  than with 
any other election, including voting for the Socialist party in 1 9 1 9  (table 1 ). In short, those 
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communes which supported the Socialists before the First World War did not tend in the least to 
do so in the post-1 920 period. Instead, they turned to communism. 
The results are even more significant for the 1 9 1 9  elections when SFIO candidates were 
on the ballot in every Correze town and village: communes voting for the Socialists in that year 
are an excellent predictor of those that would support the Communists throughout the twenties 
and thirties. Areas of pre-War Socialist strength became regions where the Communists were 
rather well implanted (and this in the same general ordering of communes), just as areas of 
Socialist weakness remained that way for the Communists.25 In both the Correze and the
Dordogne (table 5),  the Communist party stepped right in the shoes of the pre - 1920 SFIO 
leaving the Socialist party in the difficult position of having to carve out, in the long term, a 
new geographical and thus political base for itself. In the twenties and thirties it was the 
Communists who were the heirs - geographically speaking at least - of the pre - 1 920 Socialist 
party, and on this level they were right on target when they claimed to be the sole continua tors 
of the Socialist tradition. 
A largely similar situation prevailed in the Haute-Vienne. Here as well communism 
became an electoral tradition. And yet the political situation in this department hardly 
resembled that of its south-eastern neighbor. The Socialist party was by far the most powerful 
political force in the Haute-Vienne, dominating key aspects of political life. The Communists, 
in the minority within the SFIO Federation at the time of the Tours Congress (which gave birth 
to the Communist party), found themselves unable to make up the ground they had lost at the 
start, and were relegated to playing second fiddle to the Socialists throughout the twenties and 
thirties. Despite the unequal relationship between the two major forces on the Left, it was the 
Communists who, by the late twenties, succeeded in appropriating the better part of the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth century Socialist geographical base (table 4). In the bordering 
Creuse there was also a slight time lag before the Communists proved able to assume the 
geographical heritage of old Socialist party (table 6). 
The Communist vote in the Limousin and the Dordogne was thus strongly associated 
with the Socialist vote in 1 898 (Haute-Vienne),  1 906 (Correze), 1 9 1 0, 1 9 1 4, and 1 9 1 9, although 
the strength of this relationship varied between departments. Faced with widely diverging 
political situations in all four departments, the Communists successfully managed, in each case, 
to preserve and enlarge the territorial base of the old Socialist party. 
The final question which the correlational analysis can resolve is whether communism 
was, from an electoral perspective, somewhat of a "new" phenomenon which can be traced, at 
most, back to pre-War socialism, or if its geographical roots lie further back in time. In other 
9 
words was communism, as the proponents of the toujours plus a gauche theory have argued, the
end point of a long-standing leftist voting tradition in the countryside which began with the 
democrates-socialistes in 1 849? 
Communism in the Correze does not seem to have taken on the geographical succession 
of the Mountain in any significant fashion. The correlations between the democ-socs, the 
Socialist (as of 1 906), and Communist vote fail to reveal any sustained relationship (see table 
7).26 Support for the democrates-socialistes was at best a fair predictor of future (75 years
later) voting for the Communist party. Only in 1 924 (r=.29) and 1 936 (r=.22) was there a slight 
similarity between the cantonal ordering of Montagnard and Communist strength. When the 
democrate-socialiste geographical heritage did filter down to the twentieth-century it was not 
canalized by any particular political formation (save the 1 9 1 9  Radicals), but was instead 
partially inherited by the broadly defined Left (table 8). By the 1 930s, however, the Left's 
implantation had lost what little locational heritage it had acquired from its Montagnard 
predecessors.27
In the Creuse it is even more difficult to trace communism's geographical origins back to 
the middle of the nineteenth century: there exists no association whatsoever between cantonal 
support for the Montagnards and backing for either the Communists, the Socialists, the 
Radicals, or the Left (except in 1 932) m the following century (table 7).  Finally, in the Haute­
Vienne, there was equally no consistent link between democ�soc voting and communism in the 
twenties and thirties. However, Montagnard voting was a better predictor of Socialist support 
in 1 9 10 ,  1 9 1 9, and 1 924 than it was in the Correze - although it should be underlined that the 
relationship was still a moderate one. Perhaps it was no accident that this occurred in a 
department where the SFIO was particularly strong (37.4% of the vote in 1 9 1 0; 55.5% in 1 9 1 4) 
and radicalism on the wane, but this is only a hypothesis. More so than in the other Limousin 
departments, the Haute-Vienne Left preserved, and even strengthened, a moderate geographical 
link with the democrates-socia/istes well into the 1 930s, thus illustrating once again that when 
part of the democ-soc heritage survived into the first decades of the twentieth century it was 
inherited by the entire Left more so than by any particular political party. 
The link between turn of the century radicalism, and socialism and communism in later 
years, is even more elusive than it was with the democ-soc. Communes which voted ra<jical in 
1 898 (Haute-Vienne), 1 906 (Correze), 1 9 1 0, and 1 9 1 4  did not tend to support pre-Tours 
Socialists candidates or Communist candidates in the twenties and thirties (table 9). Indeed one 
can generally argue that the more communes had supported the Radicals, the less they voted for 
Left parties in future decades. 
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While communism inherited the SFIO's geographical patterns of support in the Limousin 
and the Dordogne, it is far more difficult to trace this lineage back to the Radicals and the 
Democ-Socs. Those links which did exist between Montagnard voting and future Socialist or 
Communist support - as in the Haute-Vienne - were, if anything, tentative and irregular. In 
the Correze (and the evidence indicates that this was to varying degrees the case in the other 
departments), communes neither gradually nor consistently moved from radicalism to socialism 
or communism. Socialism in this area was not a radicalized form of radicalism (which is what 
the toujours plus a gauche interpretation implies) but a new political phenomenon which, in its
early years, found a small though dedicated electorate in communes where it - and later the 
Communist party - would continue to do well over the years.28 Socialism did not continue an 
electoral tradition in this region, but one can surely argue that it created a new one which the 
Communists later appropriated. 
II 
The preceding correlational analysis broadly describes the voting behavior of communes 
and counties, not of individual voters. The strong geographical continuity between socialism 
and communism, for example, should not be interpreted as indicating that former Socialist 
voters supported the Communists; what is true of communes is not necessarily so of individuals. 
Having placed the Communist vote within a longer term perspective, we need to turn our sights 
to the short term in order to establish who Communist voters were, and who they had supported 
in the past. Plotting the trajectory of voters in the pre and post-war years is key to 
understanding the birth and development of communism in this region. Were the majority of 
the first Communists voters former Socialists? And how faithful would Communists electors 
remain to their Party over the years to come? Ecological regression is the most reliable 
statistical technique to infer individual level behavior from aggregate electoral results.29 
Ecological regression has rarely - if ever - been used in the analysis of past French elections, 
and this despite the French fascination (not always shared by scholars of France on this side of 
the Atlantic) with political geography and electoral history. 
I have used ecological regression to compute voter transition tables between pairs of 
successive elections in the Correze between 1 906 and 1 936.30 The analysis has been pushed 
back to 1 906 - 1 4  years before the Communist party's foundation - in order to trace the origins 
of Socialist and Communist voting in this department. The transition tables provide us with 
estimates of voter behavior in the short term, while the correlational analysis sheds light on 
longer term geographical permanence. The data I have used is based on the registered electorate 
1 1
in each of the Correze's 289 communes, a figure which, to take two examples, accounts for over 
95.5% of all eligible men over the age of twenty-one in both 1 932 and 1 936.31 I have included 
non-voters and ineligible voters (those eligible to vote in one election but not the other) in the 
regression equations; this last category is of particular importance in the Correze. Poverty and 
difficult living conditions had driven large numbers of the Correze's inhabitants to migrate on a 
temporary and a permanent basis ever since the nineteenth-century and this trend continued, 
albeit at a slower pace, well into the twentieth-century. As a result the number of registered 
voters often declined substantially between successive elections: the Correze, for instance, lost 
I 0% of its registered voters between 1 9 1 9  and 1 924. In order to estimate the behavior of voters 
who participated in the first election but were no longer registered to vote in the second, I have 
in most cases inverted the way transition tables are usually calculated (I have used the first -
and not the second - election as the common denominator). In other words, instead of asking 
how those who voted in 1 9 1 9  cast their ballots in 1 924, I have asked how those who voted in 
1 924 voted in the previous election. 32 
Socialism in the Correze developed at a rapid pace in the years immediately preceding 
and following the Great War. In 1 906, Socialist candidates, on the ballot in only two of the 
department's five electoral districts, polled a mere .4% of the votes cast, and between 1 905 and 
------19t-l----the-5eeialist party---aet�ers. By the eve of the war, however, Sec-ialist�---­
candidates, present in three of the Correze's electoral districts, received close to eight percent of 
the vote. Socialism's original pre-war supporters were a small, disparate lot of former non-
voters, Radicals, and more surprisingly, conservatives (the transition tables adds up to the total 
registered electorate in the bottom right hand corner. Table 1 1 , for example, shows that 2.5% 
of the registered electorate voted Socialist in 1 9 1 4  and had voted for the Right in 1 9 1  O; 
examining the columns tells us how those who had voted for the Right in 1 9 1 0  voted in 1 9 1 4, 
and reading the table horizontally illustrates how Right voters in 1 9 1 4  had cast their ballots in 
the previous election). Indeed over 40% of those who supported the SFIO in 1 9 1 4  had backed 
the Right four years earlier, and in the Tulle-Sud electoral district this proportion reached 60%. 
Part of this shift was undoubtedly linked to the practice of la po/itique du pire on the local level 
(voting first and foremost to defeat the Radicals), but it also reflected the radicalization of a 
fringe of the conservative electorate, which, however, refused to support the continued 
domination of local political life by the Radical-Socialist party. To draw a profile of Socialist 
supporters in 1 9 1 4, they were unlikely to have voted Socialist in previous elections (in part 
because Socialists had been few and far between), and were in their majority, not former 
F,adica! voters. Indeed most voters who abandoned the R_adical party in that year cast their 
ballots for the Right (table 1 1 ). The pre-war Socialist electorate thus did not owe its existence, 
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as has often been presumed, to a leftist tradition characterized by voters deserting the Radicals 
in order to support the Party furthest on the Left. 
The war profoundly altered the local political landscape and marked the end of an era 
for Correze radicalism. Having dominated the department's political life in the early years of 
the century, the Radicals now found themselves trailing the Right and challenged by the 
Socialists. Even before the elections, Henri Queuille, the young and ambitious leader of the 
Correze's Radical Socialists, realized that his Party's continued success necessitated new faces 
and policies; he thus eliminated the three outgoing Radical deputies from the Radical list and 
replaced them with younger, left-leaning candidates.33 While this strategy paid its dividends in 
the long term, it probably accentuated the Radicals' defeat in 1 9 1 9. 
level. 
The strength of the Radicals was in large part derived from their influence on the local 
The broad network of Radical-leaning municipal councillors, mayors, conseillers 
generaux, did their best to "guide" electors in their local and natiop.al political choices, and 
ensured that favors and services were, if necessary, rendered to them in return for their 
support. This practice was known as le bras long or more commonly in patois as le plar;ou 
(from the verb placer) because deputies intervened on behalf of their constituents on any 
number of issues, the most important being to find them jobs within the state administration 
(the post office, for example) or even m private mdustry.34 I he war disrupted these 
relationships of patronage which often existed between Radical deputies and their electorate. 
Soldiers returned home with a profoundly transformed mentalite prompting a Sub-Prefect to 
write that "large numbers of them are liable to ignore the advice of their natural advisers, 
mayors, parents, groups leaders, and influential electors."35 And this worked to the detriment 
of the Radicals more so than any other political grouping. 
The major downturn in radicalism's influence in the 1 9 1 9  legislative elections benefited 
conservatives more than it did Socialists, and this was not particularly surprising given that the 
Right, on the national level, emerged as the undisputed victor of these elections. Of those 
voters who deserted the Radicals in 1 9 19,  more cast their ballots for the Right as for the SFIO 
(table 1 2). Nor was this a new trend: an examination of the voting transitions between the 1 906 
and 1 9 1 0  elections clearly shows that Radical and conservative voters switched back and forth in 
important proportions (table 1 0) .  Still, former Radicals constituted over 40% of the 1 9 1 9  
Socialist electorate, and they were joined by most former Socialist voters as well as an important 
contingent of those who had chosen not to cast ballots in 1 9 1 4  (table 1 2). The new Socialists 
voters were thus of a different origin than in the pre-war years. Radicalized by the war, 
dissatisfied with the old political class, attracted by the local Socialist party's anti-militaristic 
discourse, sectors of the former Radical electorate, as well as some of those who had abstained 
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in the past, turned towards socialism. Because the Socialists were active on the terrain, held 
public meetings, organized Party sections, and proposed a coherent and attractive policy to the 
peasantry, they managed to fill part of the void left by the discredit of radicalism. The SFIO's 
modern political organization (meetings, members, propaganda campaigns, a newspaper), which 
contrasted favorably to the Radicals' often ephemeral presence between elections and to their 
lack of political structures at the grassroots,36 clearly contributed to Socialist successes. The 
presence of organized militants in the countryside enabled the Socialists to respond to the 
electorate in ways in which the Radicals could not. 
The Socialists were not the sole beneficiaries of Radicalism's decline, and in this sense it 
is erroneous to think of their growing strength as being the consequence of a traditional 
toujours plus ii gauche vote. That large numbers of Radicals jumped ship for conservative - not
leftist - shores makes the leftist tradition theory all the more difficult to uphold. Those who 
came to socialism from radicalism did so for specific social and political reasons which grew out 
of the war; theirs was not a vote of tradition but a mandate for local and national political 
change. 
Having examined where Socialist voters came from, the key question, of course, is how 
they cast their ballots following the December 1 920 Socialist split which gave birth to the 
Communist party. Who were the first Communist voters, and who had they supported in the 
past? Over 66% of the young Communist party's supporters in 1 924 had backed the Socialists in 
l 9 19; in addition, the Party also captured notable support from former abstainers, and some 
backing from Radical voters (table 1 3). But the new Communist party received far from 
unanimous support from former Socialist voters: close to half of the 1 9 1 9  Socialists either cast 
their ballots for the joint Radical-Socialist and Socialist Cartel des Gauches list (which included 
only one Socialist out of four candidates), decided not to vote, or disappeared from the 
registered electorate altogether (table 1 3). That some former Socialist voters backed the Cartel 
des Gauches list was not surprising; if anything, what was surprising was that they did so in so 
few numbers. Others, dissatisfied with the alternative they faced between tepid reformism and 
Bolshevism, decided not to vote altogether. 
Former Socialist voters thus formed the backbone of the new Communist electorate. 
Once the division between Socialists and Communists was cemented, however, there would be 
little voter switching between both parties. In 1 928,  when the Socialists ran for legislative 
office on their own for the first time since the December 1 920 Tours Congress, the 
overwhelming majority of their support came from those who had supported the Cartel des 
Gauches list in 1 924 (table 1 4). Throughout the interwar years voters seldom moved from 
socialism to communism, or vice versa. The Socialists would find new voters among former 
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conservatives in the early thirties and among previous Radicals at the time o f  the Popular Front 
(tables 1 5  and 1 6),  but rarely among previous Communist electors. 
The Communist electorate during the interwar period was characterized by a strong 
degree of stability. The majority of Communist voters in 1 928, 1 932, and 1 936, had supported 
the Party in the preceding elections. Both in 1 928 and at the time of the Popular Front 
Communist gains came at the expense of the Radicals, and in 1 928 these gains were confined to 
the department's villages, thus underlining the diverging behavior of rural and urban voters.37 
In the late twenties, rural Radical voters were more likely to switch their allegiances to the 
extreme left than were their urban counterparts. The Communists also experienced some 
success (in 1 928 and 1 936) convincing previous abstainers that their participation was indeed 
worthwhile (tables 1 4  through 1 6).38 The Party's suicidal class against class tactic discouraged 
its voters who deserted the Party in large numbers in the 1 932 legislative elections; some 
responded by casting their ballots in favor of the Radicals, while others boycotted the polls 
altogether. 
In general the Communists proved unsuccessful at luring away electors from other 
parties en masse. They met with difficulty in their attempts to convert substantial numbers of 
Radical voters and even greater difficulty courting Socialists. That voter switching was both 
more common and more extensive between Communists and Radicals, than between Communists 
and Socialists, poignantly illustrates the permanence and depth of the split between parties 
which shared a common origin. And that the Communists, despite their incessant efforts, met 
with less success than Socialists in expanding their electorate, is indicative of the limits of the 
Party's appeal in the rural Correze. 
III 
Understanding why the Communists faced difficulties in expanding their base of support 
necessitates an analysis of who Communist voters were. The Party's problems may, after all, 
have been linked to the structure of its electorate, and to its inability to make inroads among 
certain social groups. At a broader level, an explanation of the Party's implantation in the 
countryside is inseparable from an analysis of the composition of its electorate. Did peasants, 
tenant farmers, sharecroppers, or agricultural workers constitute the Party's most faithful 
supporters? Did rural workers support the "Party of the working class" in disproportionate 
numbers? Did temporary migrants, politicized during their urban sojourns, constitute a key 
element of the Communist electorate? In short, was the Party's strong showing in the rural 
Correze linked to its backing from any particular occupational group? 
1 5  
To answer this question I have collected complete data from voter registration lists on 
the occupational composition of all the 72, 796 registered voters in 287 of the Correze's 
communes in 1 930.39 Electoral lists, however, do not provide us with an entirely accurate 
picture of the occupational breakdown of those who worked the land. When men registered to 
vote they listed their age (at least 2 1  ), place of birth, address and occupation, and in the process 
some did not hesitate to use the opportunity to climb the social ladder on paper. In some 
villages, for instance, small-holding peasants declared themselves as being proprietaires instead 
of less prestigious cu/tivateurs.40 More troubling is the fact that sharecroppers, agricultural 
workers, and tenant-farmers tended understandably to list themselves as cultivateurs and are 
thus strongly underrepresented in the electoral lists. In place of this data, I have substituted 
more trustworthy figures on sharecroppers and agricultural workers culled from a 1 930 
Prefectoral survey, and statistics on tenant farmers from the village level results of the 1 929 
enquete agricole.41 The figures concerning all other professions furnish a reliable picture of the 
occupational structure of the Correze's voters.42 For the purpose of the regression analysis, I 
have grouped individuals into eight categories: small holding peasants, agricultural workers, 
tenant-farmers, sharecroppers (the last three categories together form the landless), migrants, 
artisans and shopkeepers, salaried employees (ouvriers and employes), and finally, all other 
professions.43 
The Correze's registered electorate in 1 930 was overwhelmingly agricultural (figure 1 ). 
Peasants alone constituted 63.8% of all voters, and along with sharecroppers, agricultural 
workers, and tenant-farmers (the landless), they accounted for 78% of the registered voters. 
Others worked the land as well. It was not uncommon for artisans and even shopkeepers to 
cultivate a plot of land on the side. And those who, driven by poverty, migrated to the cities 
on a temporary basis to work as masons, stonecutters and taxi-drivers, returned to their native 
villages to tend their land for three to six months a year. Portions of the rural electorate 
worked more than one trade at the same time, and the great majority were closely tied to the 
agricultural economy. When the peasantry's income declined, the shopkeepers, artisans, small 
businessmen, and country doctors who served them, suffered accordingly. 
In 1 928,  the Communists found support among a relatively well spread-out cross section 
of the rural population: peasants, the landless, artisans and shopkeepers, migrants, and a few 
salaried employees. Their electorate was more socially balanced than that of any other party. 
Those who worked the land accounted for two thirds of the Party's electorate, and property 
owning peasants alone made up one third of the Communist party's voters. An estimated 9% of 
the total peasant electorate cast its ballot for the Party's candidates (table 1 7) .  This was a 
reasonable performance - the Communists, after all, gathered far more peasant votes than their 
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Socialist arch-rivals, and the great majority of  the Correze peasantry never ventured to the left 
of the Radical-Socialist party. But these results also illustrate the limits of communism's inroads 
among the peasantry, and this, despite the Party's tireless propaganda campaigns which were 
largely geared towards the smallholding peasantry. The Communist party's peasant votes were 
hard won. To gain additional peasant support the Communists invested far more militant effort 
than did other parties. The fear - skillfully exploited by the Party's opponents - that the 
Communists, once in power, would split up the land (this was known as le partageux), clearly 
worked to Communist party's detriment.44 
The landless also formed a key component of the Communist electorate. The Party 
gathered close to half the landless vote, and together with the Socialists they virtually 
monopolized it. The more detailed breakdown of the landless vote in table 1 8  is suggestive, 
though one should exercise care in interpreting estimates of the political behavior of small 
percentages of the population. The Communist party, which promised la terre a celui qui la
travaille (the land to the one who works it), found its strongest support among tenant-farmers, 
failed to gain the support of sharecroppers, and split the votes of agricultural workers with the 
other two parties on the Left. Of these three groups, tenants farmers were the closest to small 
holding peasants,45 both in terms of interests and economic activity, and they were clearly
seduced by the Party's p1 ornises to 1nake everyone a p1 op1 h!tah e, and its dernands for higher 
prices for agricultural products. Agricultural workers, usually employed in small numbers by 
better off peasants, (the Correze was devoid of large, labor intensive farms) were less likely to 
recognize themselves in propaganda largely directed at the small peasantry, and the same was 
true of sharecroppers whose numbers had been consistently declining in the Correze.46 Even in 
a poor area such as this one the interests of peasants, sharecroppers, and agricultural workers 
could clash, and the Communists feared that by paying too close attention to those who had no 
land, they risked alienating those who they considered as being both their main constituents, as 
well as their largest reservoir of potential voters: the peasants. 
The Communists captured half of the migrant vote. Those who migrated on a temporary 
basis to Paris, Lyon, or St-Etienne to work in the building trades, in the state administration, as 
taxi drivers, or those who migrated to other rural areas to supplement their income as pit 
sawyers, traveling cobblers, tinsmiths, and wine merchants, returned to their home villages and 
supported the Communist party in strong proportions. Historians of the Limousin - and the 
evidence bears them out in this case - argue that large numbers of migrants turned towards 
revolutionary politics during their repeated sojourns in urban areas.47 In the 1 920s and 1 930s, 
local police authorities and Communist leaders alike thought that migrants played an important 
role in the political education of the rural world, 48 and the old Communist militants I
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interviewed over fifty years later invariably pointed to migration as the explanation of 
Communist strength in this region.49 Historians have generally accepted this interpretation. 
They claim that similar maps of temporary migration and Communist voting illustrate that 
migrants played a crucial role in disseminating revolutionary ideologies in the countryside and 
that temporary migrants were largely responsible for socialism's and communism's growth in 
some of the poorest, most isolated parts of the Correze. 50 A detailed regression analysis,
however, fails to support this theory. Neither peasants, nor the landless, nor artisans and 
shopkeepers living in migrant villages were more likely to vote for the Communists than those 
who lived in other villages. Nor were they more likely to support the Party if they lived in 
communes with a large percentage of migrant voters (table 20). Migrants displayed political 
proclivities which distinguished them from their fellow villagers, but they do not seem to have 
played the influential role in spreading leftist ideas that some have ascribed to them. Even in 
migrant areas rural communism was not "imported" from urban areas, but was a largely 
indigenous movement which owed its success to grassroots organizing, and to backing from a 
broad spectrum of occupational groups. 
Finally, artisans and shopkeepers, who occupied a central position in village 
communities, supported the Communists in notable proportions. Their propensity for left-wing 
politics - they cast over half their ballots for Socialist and Communist candidates - is striking. 51
Artisans assumed key roles within the Communist party - as village cell secretaries in particular 
- in part because they were better placed to pass along the Party's watchwords. Peasants from 
outlying hamlets dropped by their shop, located in the village center, to conduct business, catch 
up on the news, and perhaps have a drink at the care. Rural depopulation, along with the 
agricultural crisis of the late twenties, hit artisans and shopkeepers particularly hard. As their 
customers emigrated towards brighter shores, and as those who stayed cut back on their 
spending, blacksmiths, carpenters, and sabot-makers, along with bakers, grocers, and care 
owners (to give a few examples) found that they, too, had trouble making ends meet. For most 
of these people defending their livelihood meant first and foremost defending the interests of 
their main clients: the peasants.52 Less concerned about the threat of le partage (splitting up
the land), they turned towards the Left in an effort to find a solution to the agricultural crisis. 
Largely preoccupied with their work among the peasantry, Correze Communists, not 
fully aware of the importance of artisans and shopkeepers within their electorate, rarely made 
sustained efforts to increase their support among these groups. In the mid- l 920s, Leon Bossavy, 
one of the Party's most gifted local leaders, known for his physical resemblance to Lenin, 
launched a one-man effort to group artisans and shopkeepers throughout the Correze and bring 
them over to the Party's views. 5s Bossavy's growing interest in these social groups eventually
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contributed to his separation from the Party in the late twenties. It was difficult enough, in the 
face of ouvrieriste pressures, to pursue work among the peasantry, but to go after the votes of 
what Bossavy termed the "middle classes" posed even greater problems. Not until late 1 937 did 
Correze Communists renew their attempts to increase their audience among artisans and 
shopkeepers. 54 That Communists nonetheless received notable support from these groups
indicates that their peasant propaganda struck a chord with village blacksmiths, cobblers, 
carpenters, grocers, and so on, whose fortunes were closely linked to those of the peasantry. 
The Communists thus found support in the countryside not among sharecroppers, rural 
workers and employees, but from a balanced mix of small holding peasants, tenant farmers, 
agricultural workers, temporary migrants, artisans and shopkeepers. Their electors shared close 
ties to the agricultural economy and were sensitive to its downturns and fluctuations. The 
Communists, on the other hand, did poorly among those whose economic well-being was less 
dependent on the peasantry: workers and employees (who in their majority voted for the 
Radicals), along with members of all other professions such as notables, merchants, 
businessmen, rentiers, students, and the retired, who divided their allegiances between Radicals 
and Conservatives. The social composition of the Party's electorate emerged largely unscathed 
from the Party's strong setback at the polls in 1 932 (table 1 9). Those who worked the land still 
-----�p�r�onvnind�ed--rw<rthtrdruf the l':rrty'o-vutes, the proportion of attisans am:t--shopkeep�hitr1 ->t-1'h�e�----­
Communist electorate increased while the Party lost some support among migrants. Over time, 
stability was the dominant trait of the social composition of the Communist electorate. 
These findings contrast with the results of previous investigations. For Philippe Gratton, 
the Party's support in the Correze came primarily from small-holding peasants (and not tenant 
farmers or artisans) and from the Tulle working class. 55 Gratton's questionable theory that the
strength of Correze rural communism walked hand in hand with the success of a Communist 
sponsored agricultural trade union of small holders, blinded him to the possibility that the Party 
could have received backing from other rural groups.56 The quantitative study presented above,
however, illustrates how varied the Party's electorate was in a department largely composed of 
peasant voters, brings to light the role of artisans and shopkeepers (ignored by previous 
observers of rural communism)57 while suggesting that rural workers were less sympathetic to
the Party of the working class than commonly presumed. 
* 
Communists, and their pre-1920 Socialists predecessors, were neither the beneficiaries of 
a long-standing leftist tradition, nor the clear successors of the Radicals. "Tradition" did not 
motivate rural voters to cast their ballots for Socialist and later Communist candidates. The 
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absence of a toujours plus ii gauche vote in one of the regions where it has been thought
strongest places Communist successes in new perspective, and underlines that an explanation of 
the Party's strength in the countryside is to be found in the economic, social, and political 
development of the first four decades of the twentieth century. Moreover, the long term 
electoral analysis presented for the four Limousin and Dordogne departments questions the 
commonly accepted idea that French political parties have geographical roots that reach far back 
in time. 
Neither local Communists, Prefects, nor contemporary observers of the political scene 
preoccupied themselves with the structure and composition of the Party's electorate - if 
anything the assumption was that members and voters alike were largely peasants. 58 It was 
surely no accident if Prefects referred to the Party as le parti communiste paysan and the 
movement as a whole as le communisme agraire.59 The present analysis, however, suggests that 
it was not a peasant communism as much as it was a rural communism. Far from France's 
industrial heartland the Party mobilized a diverse, original rural electorate of small holding 
peasants, tenant farmers, agricultural workers, artisans and shopkeepers. The coalition the 
Communists forged in the early twenties remained remarkably faithful to a Party which, 
following initial successes, experienced difficulty in substantially expanding both its electorate 
_____ aruruLits_g_e_ographical base until after the Second World War. 
The Limousin and Dordogne, long ignored by observers of all kind, and rarely given 
serious treatment in histories of the French Communist movement, are among those regions 
which have survived the Party's important losses since the late 1 970s. For reasons rooted both 
in history and in the present day rural sociology of the region, the remnants of the rural 
movement which Correze Communists built in the 1920s have at times outlasted - if only 
temporarily - the Party's better known urban bastions. Here, as elsewhere, it is perhaps only a 
matter of time before the Party disappears in large part from the political landscape, thus 
completing an ongoing process which is partially related to the disappearance of the rural social 
groups which contributed to make this area a stronghold of French communism for over sixty 
years. 
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Mai 1 849." 
27. Compare these results with Ernest Labrousse's influential article "Geographie du
socialisme," where the author traces the better part of the geographical implantation of the 
modern French left back to the 1 849 Montagnards. Labrousse had called attention to the 
correspondence between the democ-soc and the joint Socialist-Communist map of electoral 
support in the twentieth century. The correlations do not support this thesis in the three 
Limousin departments. In nine of twelve elections the correlation between the democ-soc and 
the combined Socialist-Communist vote is actually lower than it is for the Left as a whole, and 
never reaches significant levels. 
28. I thus disagree with Denis Faugeras who argues that rural communism was the
"natural child" of the Radical Party and constituted nothing more than a "Parti Radical bis." 
"Recherches sur !'evolution politique de la Correze sous la troisieme Republique 1 8 7 1 - 1946," 
These de doctoral d'etat en Droit, Universite de Limoges, 1 986, pp. 527-8. 
29. The best discussion of ecological regression remains J. Morgan Kousser, "Ecological
Regression and the Analysis of Past Politics," Journal of Interdisciplinary History 4 ( 1 973): 
237-262; see also Laura Irwin Langbein and Allan J. Lichtman, Ecological Inference (Beverly 
Hiiis and London, 1 978), pp. 50-60; Randolph A. Roth, ''Ecological Regression and the Analysis 
of Voter Behavior," Historical Methods 1 9  ( 1 986): 1 03- 1 1 7; David E. and Stephane E. Booth, 
"An Introduction to the Use of Ecological and Robust Regression in Historical Research," 
23 
Historical Methods 21 (1988): 35-44. Ecological regression has recently been used by scholars 
of Weimar Germany eager to identify who National Socialists voters were, and who they had 
previously backed. Among the best and most recent examples of this work is Jilrgen W. Falter 
and Reinhard Zintl, "The Economic Crisis of the 1930s and the Nazi Vote," Journal of 
Interdisciplinary History 19 ( 1 988): 55-85. 
30. The transition tables were obtained by running least squares regressions where the
dependent variable was the percentage vote for Party a in election a, and the independent 
variables the percentage vote for parties a, b, c, d, . . .  etc., along with non-voters and ineligibles 
in election b. 
3 1 .  The tables are based on 290 cases because the town of Tulle was divided into two 
electoral precincts, each belonging to separate cantons. 
32. A number of analysts argue that the regressions should be weighted by the number
of electors in order to control for important variations in population between villages. I have 
compared the results of both the unweighted and weighted regressions and have found few 
notable differences. I have generally opted for the transition table which produced the fewest 
"illogical results" (outside the 0 to 100% bounds) or which corresponded best to the historical 
evidence. The percentages in the unweighted transition tables are mean percentages, while those 
in the weighted tables are the actual percentages. 
33. For a few comments on this see Gilles Le Beguec, "Henri Queuille: L'originalite
d'un parcours politique," In Henri Queuille et la Correze. Actes du Col/oque de Tulle (Limoges, 
1986), 3 1 -2. 
34. This was important in a poor region such as the Correze. A job within the
admm1stration was a guarantee of a secure mcome for a fam1 y. 
35. ADC 3Ml94, sous-prefet Ussel to prefet Correze, 3 September 1 9 1 9.
36. On the difference between Radical and Socialist models of political organization,
Serge Berstein, "Les partis," in Rene Remond, ed., Pour une hisloire polilique (Paris, 1988), pp. 
70-73. 
37. This is made clear by a more detailed regression analysis which shows that in 1928
the Communists received no support from former Radical voters in the Correze's 1 3  largest 
towns. 
38. For Annie Moulin Communist gains in the rural Correze in 1936 were the result of
Radical voters moving to the left. The transition table, however, indicates that the PCF also 
gathered notable support from previous non-voters. Les paysans dans la societe fran9aise, p. 
1 9 1 .  
39. I have excluded the department's two largest towns, Tulle and Brive, from this
analysis. 
40. The electoral law required voters to submit documents proving their age and
nationality, but required no proof of one's occupation. In general it seems that a voter's 
declaration of his profession was transcribed to the electoral list, but in some cases it is clear 
that the administrative committee in charge arbitrarily called all peasants proprietaires, or all 
those who workea the land cuwvateurs. On voter registration iists see Leo Goldenberg and 
Roger Pinto, La revision des lisles e/eclora/es (Paris, [ 1936]), and A. de Taillandier, Manuel de 
la revision de la lisle e/eclorale, 4th ed., (Paris, 1923). 
24 
4 1 .  For data on sharecroppers and agricultural workers see ADC 7M47, and for tenant 
farmers the results of the enquete agrico/e in ADC 7M306- 7M3 l 8. The enquete agricole was 
the subject of much confusion throughout the entire country (the final results were not 
published until 1 936) and the initial forms were so poorly filled out that local authorities were 
asked to complete them a second time. I have ignored the initial results which can be found in 
ADC 6M577-6M580 and used the results which were adjusted by the direction des services 
agrico/es. The sum of these figures does not always correspond to the departmental wide totals 
printed in the published enquete in 1936. The voter registration lists I have used are in ADC 
3M93-3Ml 76. 
42. Electoral lists have rarely been used by students of French elections. I have
preferred them to census lists (listes nominatives) because they provide a far more accurate 
picture of the registered electorate: the listes nominatives include men who were either not 
eligible or not registered to vote. In general, I have not found census lists to be more accurate 
concerning a person's profession than voter registration rolls. Some have cautioned, correctly, 
that voter registration lists provide us only with an elector's profession at the time of his initial 
registration, and that officials were not required to note occupational changes in subsequent 
years. I have compared electoral lists for 1 920, 1930, and 1 939 and have found a number of 
instances concerning voters whose names appear in all three years with two or three different 
professions listed - thus demonstrating that the occupation of some voters was updated over 
time. This is not surprising in small villages where those in charge of updating voter 
registration lists knew their electors well. In Lyon, Jean-Luc Pino! found that in the "great 
majority of cases" the profession of voters was identical or similar on voter registration lists and 
on the listes nominatives. See his Espace social et espace politique. Lyon a /'epoque du Front
populaire (Lyon, 1 980), p. 1 68 note 58, and pp. 8, 9, 46 for a discussion of voter registration 
lists. See as well Jacques Girault et al., "Remarques sur l'etude de l'electorat communiste," 
Cah1ers d'h1stoire de /'lnst1tut Maunce 1horez (Jan 1913), p. 31, note 10. Few have attempted 
to estimate the social composition of a given party's electorate based on voter registration lists; 
those who have done so have rarely submitted convincing statistical evidence in support of their 
findings. Consult Pierre George's study on Bourg-la-Reine in Charles Moraze et al., Eludes de 
sociologie electorale (Paris, 1 947), Frani;ois Goguel, Initiation aux recherches de geographie 
e/ectora/e (Paris, 1 949), pp. 80-87, and on the Communist party, Girault's articles cited above 
and his, "Vie politique et categories sociales populaires: l'exemple du Var dans !es annees 1 930," 
in Classes et categories socia/es. Aspects de la recherche (Roubaix, 1985),  pp. 193- 1 98. 
Girault's work demonstrates the difficulty of drawing broad conclusions concerning the 
Communist electorate without a minimal use of quantification. 
43. I originally worked with a more detailed list of twenty one occupational categories,
but the small size of many of these groups (e.g., merchants, schoolteachers, rentiers and the 
retired) makes it difficult to provide reliable estimates of their political behavior. I have 
controlled the regression equations for religiosity (percentage of civil burials 1924- 1 938; my 
thanks to Louis Perouas for kindly providing �e with this data), population change between
1 9 3 1  and 1 90 1 ,  and population density per km in 1 9 3 1 .  I have preferred the unweighted 
coefficients to those weighted by the registered electorate in 1 930 largely because the latter 
produce more "illogical" estimates (i.e., outside the 0 - 1 00% limits) than the former. There are 
no major differences between the two - save for artisans which I discuss below. 
44. On the Party's efforts among the peasantry see Laird Boswell, "Rural Communism in
France, 1 920- 1 939: The Example of the Limousin and the Dordogne," Ph.D. Thesis, University 
of California, Berkeley, 1 988,  pp. 471 -499. 
45. It is telling that virtually all tenant farmers listed themselves as cultivateurs on the
electoral lists. This was far less the case of sharecroppers and agricultural workers. 
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46. The regression overestimates the strength of the Right among sharecroppers;
calculated using only those 2 1 1  communes where Conservatives candidates were present, the 
regression indicates a more moderate relationship between sharecropping and the Right. 
47. Gratton, "Le communisme rural en Correze," pp. 1 9-22.
48. Le Travailleur de la Terre, August-September 1 924; Le Travailleur du Centre­
Ouest, 4 and 1 1  September 1926, 25  February 1933. 
1983. 
49. Interview with Marcel Theyzillat at his home in Lacelle (Correze), 2 September
50. Gratton, "Le communisme rural en Correze," pp. 2 1 -22.
5 1 .  The weighted regression suggest notably stronger conservative support among 
artisans and shopkeepers. This is because artisans and shopkeepers in ten of the department's 
largest towns (excluding Brive and Tulle) voted in strong proportions for the Right, thus 
underlining that artisans behaved differently in urban and rural settings. 
52. This was all the more true in small villages where it was not uncommon for
shopkeepers and artisans to farm a small plot of land on the side. 
53. Bossavy was a self-employed artisan-miroitier in Tulle. He argued that artisans,
shopkeepers, and peasants all belonged to the "middle classes" and could be won over to the 
cause of the proletariat. Le Travail/eur du Centre Guest, 24 December 1927; see also the issues 
of 1 2  June 1 926 and 1 9  November 1927. 
54. Le Travailleur de la Correze, 13 November and 4 December 1 937.
55. Gratton, "Le communisme rural en Correze," p. 33, 4 1 .  Gratton forwards no 
evidence to show that the Party's support in Tulle came from workers. In 1 928, the 
Communists received 23.4% of the vote in Tulle (versus 2 1 . 1% in the Correze as a whole) and 
some of that support clearly came from peasants who lived within the town's limits, and from 
shopkeepers and artisans. The Party met with consistent fifficulty in trying to organize the
town's workers. See ADC 4M282 and Archives Nationales F 1 3 1 20. 
56. Jean-Marie Denquin has proposed that the Communist party's Correze electorate in
the 1 950s and 1 960s was largely composed of farmers (agriculteurs), though once again the 
evidence to support this contention is lacking. See Le renversement de la majorite electorale 
dans le departement de la Correze 1958-1973 (Paris, 1973), p. 27.
57. While Michel Cade finds that in the Pyrenees-Orientales shopkeepers and artisans
accounted for 14.4% of the Party's members in 1 937- 1 938,  he never suggests that they may have 
played a role within the Party's electorate, Le parti des campagnes rouges, p. 278. 
58. The Communists attributed their 1 928 success in the northern Correze to the votes
of small property owners and agricultural workers. Le Travailleur du Centre Guest, 28 April 
1 928. 
59. ADC 7M22, 4M282, and I M69.
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CORREZE 
Social Composition of Registered Electorate in 1930 
(f igure is the mean 
percen tage for 
282 communes) 
(Landless includes 
sharecroppers (3,S'!li) 
tenant farmers (4,7'!1.) 
agricultural workers (6,3'!1.) 
Artshop includes Landless 
artisans and shopkeepers) 1 4 , 4  
I Otrer
6 . 7  
Ar t shop 
Migrantf ·8
2 , 4  
27 
Table I 
Correze. Correlation Matrix. Percentage pre-1920 Socialist and Communist vote by commune 
1906- 1936. (% of registered voters) 
PS 1906 PS1 9 1 0  PS 1 9 1 4  PS 1 9 1 9  PC 1924 PC 1928 PC 1 932 
N= ( 7 1 )  ( 1 25) ( 1 9 1 )  (290) (290) (290) (290) 
PS 1 9 1 0  .623 
PS 1 9 1 4  . 5 1 8  .545 
PS 1 9 1 9  .452 .462 .591  
PC 1 924 .523 .420 .530 .698 
PC 1 928 .53 1 .327 .6 1 5  . 7 1 7  .774 
PC 1 932 .466 .231  .349 .649 .760 .802 
PC 1 936 .508 .347 .331  .633 .721 .748 .846 
PC = Parti Communiste 
PS = Parti Socia/isle 
RS = All Radical Candidates 
a e 
Correze. Correlation Matrix. Percentage Socialist Vote by Commune, 1 906- 1936. (% of 
registered voters) (Number of Cases in parentheses) 
PS 1 906 PS1 9 1 0  PS 1 9 1 4  PS 1 9 1 9  RS 1 924* PSI 928 PC 1932 
N= (7 1 )  ( 125) ( 1 9 1 )  (290) (290) ( 1 53) (290) 
PS 1 9 1 0  .623 
PS 1 9 1 4  . 5 1 8  .545 
PS 1 9 1 9  .452 .462 .591 
RS 1 924* -.395 -.236 -.303 -.242 
PS 1 928 .0 1 8  -.058 .483 . 1 88 
(54) (54) ( 1 53)  ( 1 53) 
PS 1 932 .0 1 2  .030 -.2 1 0  . 1 48 . 1 52 .723 
PS 1 936 -.235 -.05 1 - . 1 30 .086 .320 .635 .61 1 
*Radical led Cartel des Gauches list which included one socialist candidate
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Table 3 
Correze. Correlation Matrix. Percentage Radical vote by Commune, 1906 - 1 936. 
(N=290 except for RS 1936 where N=236) (% of registered voters) 
RS 1 906 RS 1 9 1 0  RS 1 9 1 4  R S  1 9 1 9  R S  1 924* RS 1 928 RS 1932 
RS 1 9 1 0  .398 
RS 1 9 1 4  .205 .623 
RS 1 9 1 9  - . 1 79 .025 .344 
RS 1 924* .075 . 1 40 .345 .472 
RS 1 928 -.327 -.268 . 1 38 .579 .278 
RS 1 932 .0 1 7  -.271 -.030 .353 . 3 1 2  .634 
RS 1 936 - . 1 03 -.026 . 102 . 168 -.077 .209 .375 
* Radical led Cartel des gauches list which included one Socialist candidate.
Table 4 
Haute-Vienne. Correlation Matrix. Percentage pre-1920 Socialist and Communist Vote by 
Commune, 1898-1936. (% of registered voters) 
PS 1 898 PS1 9 1 0  PS 1 9 1 4  PS 1 9 1 9  P C  1 924 PC 1 928 PC 1932 
N= (63) (205) (205) (206) (206) (206) (206) 
PS 1 9 1 0  .327 
PS 1 9 1 4  .205 .78 1 
PS 1 9 1 9  .378 .627 .740 
PC 1 924 .501 .328 .237 .361 
PC 1 928 .504 .595 .497 .601 .728 
PC 1 932 .568 .543 .430 .477 .735 .836 
PC 1 936 .449 .448 .395 .461 . 7 1 6  . 8 1 9  .876 
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Table 5 
Dordogne. Correlation Matrix. Percentage Pre- 1 920 Socialist, and Communist vote by 
Canton, 1 9 1 0 - 1936, (% of registered voters) (N=47) 
PS 1 9 1 0  PS 1 9 1 4  PS 1 9 1 9  PC 1 924 PC 1 928 PC 
1 932 
PS 1 9 1 4  .584 
PS 1 9 1 9  .467 . 8 1 5  
P C  1 924 .385 .756 .827 
PC 1 928 .4 1 4  .647 .65 1 .769 
PC 1 932 .263 .679 .753 .862 .793 
PC 1 936 .274 .609 .507 .595 .686 .693 
Table 6 
Creuse. Correla!ton Matrix. Percentage fY19 Soc1ahst anilCommumst VO!elly Commune, 
1919- 1936. (N = 266) 
PS 1 9 1 9  PC 1 924 PC 1 928 PC 1 932 
PC 1 924 0.405 
PC 1 928 0.620 0.480 
PC 1 932 0.624 0.504 0.776 
PC 1 936 0.489 0.278 0.58 1 0.662 
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Table 7 
Limousin. Correlation Matrix. Percentage Democrate-Socialiste Vote in 1849, Socialist, 
Communist, and Radical Vote by Canton (% of valid votes cast) 
Democrate-Socialiste vote 1 849 
Correze Creuse Haute-Vienne 
(N=29) (N=25) (N=29) 
PS 1 906 -.065 
PS 1 9 1 0  .202 .036 .324 
PS 1 9 1 4  .09 1 .053 .200 
PS 1 9 1 9  . 1 43 .055 .362 
PC 1924 .293 .047 - .067 
PC 1 928 . 1 46 . 1 55 .344 
PC 1 932 . 1 98 .078 . 1 78 
PC 1 936 .223 .077 . 1 90 
PS 1924 .077 .434 
PS 1 928 .037 - .003 - .207 
PS 1 932 - . 0 1 2  .204 .0 1 8  
P5T93 -- .ff . c  .n 
RS 1 906 .042 
RS 1 9 1 0  .242 - . 0 1 5  - .230 
RS 1 9 1 4  .259 -.292 . 1 53 
RS 1 9 1 9  .363 - . 167 
RS 1 924* .046 .082 
RS 1928 . 1 43 - .044 .229 
RS 1 932 .030 - . 0 1 2  .260 
RS 1 936 - . 1 75 -.282 .326 
* Radical led Cartel des Gauches list in the Correze which included one Socialist candidate.
Note: In the few instances where a Party was not present in a given district its vote has been 
set at zero. This has little effect on the coefficients. 
3 1  
Table 8 
Limousin. Correlation Matrix. Percentage Democrate-Socialiste vote in 1849 and Left vote by 
Canton, 1906 - 1 936 (% of valid votes cast) 
Democrate Socialiste vote, I 849
Correze Creuse Haute-Vienne 
(N=29) (N=25) (N=29) 
Left 1906 .035 
Left 1 9 1 0  .294 .073 .000 
Left 1 9 1 4  .338 -.2 1 5  .532 
Left 1 9 1 9  .360 - . 1 23 .362 
Left 1 924 .420 . 1 9 1  .378 
Left 1 928 .3  I I . 1 04 .360 
Left 1 932 .221 .377 . 4 1 4  
Left 1 936 .000 - . 1 38 . 5 1 5  
Table 9 
Correze and Haute-Vienne. Correlation Matrix of Radical vote with Socialist and Communist 
Voting, 1898- 1936. (% of registered votes) 
(Number of cases in parentheses) 
Correze Haute-Vienne 
RS 06 RS 1 0  RS 1 4  RS 98 RS 1 0  RS 1 4  
N= (290) (290) (290) (203) ( 1 86) (205) 
PS 1 9 1 0  .064 .327 
( 1 25) 
PS 1 9 1 4  .029 -.43 1 .256 - . 4 1 6  
( 1 9 1 )  ( 1 9 1 )  
PS 1 9 1 9  .049 -.072 -.076 .3 1 1 -.297 - . 33 1 
PC 1 924 .053 -.03 I -.085 .002 -.255 - .097 
PC 1 928 .020 - . 1 55 - . 1 69 . I  79 - .296 -.047 
PC 1 932 -.088 -.086 -.057 . 1 70 - .356 -.078 
PC 1 936 -.054 -.056 .029 .2 1 4  -.363 .002 
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Table 1 0  
Correze. Estimated voter movements between 1906 and 1910 legislative elections. 
(Row column percentages; village level data) (N=290) (by percent of 1 906 
registered electorate) 
1 9 1 0  Election PS 
PS . 1  
RAD 0 
RIGHT 0 
NV .2 
INEL 0 
% of 1 906 .3 
Electorate 
PC 
PS 
RAD 
RIGHT 
NV 
= Parti Communiste 
= Parti Socia/isle 
= All Radical Candidates 
= All Right Candidates 
= non voters 
1 906 Election 
RAD RIGHT 
.7 .2 
33.9 1 2.3 
1 0.7 7.4 
4.6 5.3 
. 1 .2 
50 25.4 
% of 1 906 
NV Electorate 
.6 1 .6 
1 .8 48 
2.2 20 
l 9.3 29.5 
.4 .7 
24.2 1 00 
--------�INEL Ineligible feligible to----vote-in-e-lection-a-but not in election b, 01 v+ce=ver=i�-----
Note: Percentages calculated through ecological regression. Estimates which fall outside 
the 0 - 1 00% logical bounds have been set to their respective minimum or maximum, and 
remaining cell entries have been adjusted by an iterative fitting procedure. 
Table 1 1
Correze. Estimated voter movements between 1910 and 1914 legislative elections. 
(Row column percentages; village level data) (N=290) (by percent of 1 9 1 0  
registered electorate) 
1 9 1 4  Election 
PS 
RAD 
RIGHT 
NV 
Tlt.TT"'T 
1!"1..C:.L 
% of 1 9 1 0  
Electorate 
PS 
.6 
.4 
0 
.4 
' .,:.
1 .6 
1 9 1 0  Election 
RAD RIGHT 
1 .2 2.5 
40.8 0 
6.3 1 5.5 
0 2.3 
' , .,:. . � 
48.2 20.6 
% of 1 9 1 0  
NV Electorate 
1 5 .3  
.8  42 
0 2 1 .8 
20 22.8 
� , 0 ' , . .. . . . 
29.5 1 00 
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Table 1 2  
Correze. Estimated voter movements between 1 9 1 4  and 1 9 1 9  legislative elections. 
(Row column percentages; village level data) (N=290) (by percent of 1 9 1 9  
registered electorate; weighted by registered electorate in 1 9 1 9) 
1 9 1 4  Election 
PS 
RAD 
RIGHT 
NV 
INEL 
% of 1 9 1 9  
Electorate 
PS 
4 
7.3 
.5 
4.9 
.3 
1 7  
1 9 1 9  Election 
RAD RIGHT 
1 .8 0 
22.3 9.6 
.4 1 8.4 
1 .8 0 
0 0 
26.3 27.9 
Table 1 3  
% of 1 9 1 9  
NV Electorate 
. I 5.8 
5.7 44.9 
3.6 22.8 
1 8 .6 25.4 
.6 I 
28.7 100 
Correze. Estimated voter movements between 1 9 1 9  and 1924 legislative elections. 
(Row column percentages; village level data) (N=290) (by percent of 1 9 1 9  
registered electorate; weighted by registered electorate i n  1 9 1 9) 
1 924 Election 
PC 
RAD 
RIGHT 
NV 
INEL 
% of 1 9 1 9  
Electorate 
PS 
9.6 
3.7 
0 
2.6 
I .  I 
1 7
1 9 1 9  Election 
RAD RIGHT 
1 .2 0 
2 1  9.3 
0 1 8 .6 
2.3 0 
1 .8 0 
26.3 27.9 
% of 1 9 1 9  
NV Electorate 
4.6 1 5.4 
3.4 37.4 
2.6 2 1 .2 
1 1 .6 1 6.6 
6.4 9.4 
28.7 1 00 
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Table 1 4  
Correze. Estimated voter movements between 1924 and 1928 legislative elections. 
(Row column percentages; village level data) (N=290) (by percent of 1924 
registered electorate) 
1 928 Election 
PC 
PS 
RAD 
RIGHT 
NV 
INEL 
% of 1 924 
Electorate 
PC 
1 1 .7 
.9 
1 .4 
.2 
0 
0 
14.2 
1924 Election 
RAD RIGHT 
2.3 .4 
6.4 .6 
24.2 8 
6.5 1 3 .9 
3.7 .9 
. I 0 
43.2 23.8 
Table 1 5  
% of 1 924 
NV Electorate 
1 .7 1 6 . 1  
0 8 
1 .8 35.4 
.2 20.8 
14.8 19.4 
.2 .3 
1 8.7 JOO 
Correze. Estimated voter movements between 1928 and 1932 legislative elections. 
(Row column percentages; village level data) (N=290) (by percent of 1 928 
registered electorate; weighted by the registered electorate in 1 928) 
l 928 Election 
% of 1928 
1932 Election PC PS RAD RIGHT NV Electorate 
PC 1 0.4 .9 .3 0 .5 1 2.2 
PS I 7.6 .5 5 1 .3 15.5 
RAD 3.4 0 24.8 5.4 3.2 36.8 
RIGHT . 7  .7 0 1 2.6 1 .6 1 5.6 
NV 1 .5 0 6 0 1 2.3 19.8 
INEL 0 0 0 0 0 . I  
% of 1 928 1 7 .  I 9.2 3 1 .7 23 1 9  JOO 
1:' 1 .o.,..i-n ... n4-o. 
.J....l\,,'-'LVJ.QL"" 
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Table 1 6  
Correze. Estimated voter movements between 1932 and 1936 legislative elections. 
(Row column percentages; village level data) (N=290) (by percent of 1 932 
registered electorate; weighted by the registered electorate in 1 936) 
1 936 Election 
% of 1 936 
1932 Election PC PS RAD RIGHT NV Electorate 
PC 1 0.7 I . I  0 . I . I 1 2. I 
PS I 1 1 .4 0 2.7 .3 1 5.4 
RAD 3.5 1 4 . 1  1 3.2 2.6 3.2 36.6 
RIGHT 0 ! .4 2 . 1  9.9 2 . 1  1 5.5 
NV 2.5 0 5 .7  0 1 1 .4 1 9.7  
INEL 0 .2 .2 0 .2 .6 
% of 1 936 1 7.9 28.3 2 1 . 1  1 5.3 1 7.3  J OO 
Electorate 
Table 1 7  
Correze. Estimated voting behavior of Social groups in 1928 (% of 1930 Registered 
Electorate) (N=282) 
% of 1 930 
PC PS RAD RIGHT NV Electorate 
Peasants 5.3 .9 29.3 1 6.8 1 1 .4 63.8 
Landless 6.2 5 0 .2 3 1 4.4 
Migrants I . I  0 .7 0 .6 2.4 
Artshop 2.8 2 . 1  0 1 .7 2.2 8.8 
Salaried .8  0 2.7 0 .5 4 
Other 0 0 3.6 2.7 .5 6.7 
% of 1930 1 6.2 8 36.3 2 1 .4 1 8 . 1  1 00 
Electorate 
Note: Percentages calculated through ecological regression. Estimates which fall outside the 0 - 1 00% 
logical bounds have been set to their respective minimum or maximum, and remaining cell entries 
have been adjusted by an iterative fitting procedure. Controlling for lack of religious practice 
(percentage of civil burials, 1 924 - 1 938), population change between 193 1 and 1 90 I ,  and population per 
km2 in 1 93 1 .
Peasants = 
Landless = 
Migrants = 
Artshop = 
Other = 
Cultivateurs and proprietaires 
Sharecroppers, tenant farmers, agricultural workers. 
Those in migrant communes working in the building industry (ma9ons. cimentiers. 
p/iitriers. peintres, couvreurs, etc.), taxi drivers, chauffeurs, livreurs, gar9on de ca[e, 
scieurs de long, cobblers, traveling salesmen, umbrella salesmen, tinsmiths. 
Artisans and shopkeepers. 
merchants, entrepreneurs, schoolteachers, doctors, soldiers, students, rentiers, the 
unemployed, and all other professions. 
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Table 1 8  
Correze. Estimated voting behavior of Social groups in 1 928 (% of Registered Voters) 
(N=280) 
% of 1930 
PC28 PS28 RAD28 RIGHT28 NV28 Electorate 
Peasants 6.8 1 . 3 27.8 15 .3  1 2.5 63.7 
Sharecroppers 0 .9 0 1 .9 .6 3.5 
Agri 
Workers 1 .6 1 .6 2 . 1  .2 .7 6.3 
Tenant 
Farmers 2.7 1 .6 0 0 .4 4.7 
Migrants 1 .2 0 .5 0 .6 2.4 
Arts hop 3 2.7 0 1 . 1  2 8.8 
Salaried 1 0 2.4 0 .5 4 
Other 0 0 3.3 2.7 .6 6.7 
% of 1930 1 6. 3  8 36.3 2 1 .2 1 8  1 00 
Electorate 
Table 1 9  
Correze. Estimated voting behavior of Social groups in 1932 (% of 1930 Registered 
Electorate) (N=282) 
% of 1930 
PC32 PS32 RAD32 RIGHT32 NV32 Electorate 
Peasants 3.6 5.4 3 1 . 8  9.9 1 3. l 63.8 
Landless 4.4 5.6 1 .7 1 1 .8 14.4 
Migrants .5 0 .9 0 I 2.4 
Artshop 2.6 2 1 . 1  1 . 1  1 .9 8.8 
Salaried .7 . 1  2 . 1  0 1 4 
Other 0 .3 2.7 2.2 1 .4 6.7 
% of 1 930 1 1 .7 1 3.5 40.4 1 4.2 20.2 1 00 
Electorate 
37 
Table 20 
Voting behavior of Peasants, Landless, and Artisans in Migrant Communes (N=283) 
(t statistic in parentheses) 
Peasants 
Landless 
Artisans 
Migrant Communes 
-.045 
.045 
- . 1 28 
(-.83 1 ) 
(.450) 
(- .53 1 )  
High Migrant Communes 
- .005 
.007 
.032 
( 1 .482) 
(.622) 
( 1 .79 1 )  
Note: Results of three separate OLS regression run with a dummy variable for migrant 
communes. Peasants in migrant communes = % peasants in these communes, and 0 if 
otherwise. Peasants in high migrant communes = % peasant * % migrant, and 0 if 
otherwise. Same applies to landless and artisans. 
